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ACCOUNTABILITY OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Laura A. Dickinsont
As our panelists have discussed and as Dean Koh mentioned in his lecture
last night, the decisions regarding detainees in the so-called "war on terror" -
Haindi, I Padilla,2 and Rasul3 - leave a number of questions unresolved. Such
questions include: (1) What substantive rights do the different categories of
detainees actually have under U.S. constitutional law? (2) What rights might
they have under international law? (3) Should Rasul, the case involving non-
citizens detained at Guantanamo, be confined to its facts? And (4) Is there
something special about the status of Guantanamo that gives U.S. courts
jurisdiction over what goes on there, or does the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
extend to any context in which the United States has custodial power over
detainees anywhere in the world? Certainly some language in the opinion
supports the broader reading, but we will need to await future litigation to
resolve the issue.
As Brad Berenson has noted in his presentation for this panel, the
Administration is currently arguing for the most limited possible interpretation
of these Supreme Court cases. Berenson defends this approach by suggesting
that, in order to maintain national security, we should be very concerned about
placing any check on executive authority in the war on terror.
4
f Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This is an edited transcript of a
presentation delivered as part of the 2004 University of Tulsa College of Law Symposium:
International Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Tenn: Building Bridges or Constructing
Barriers Between National, Foreign, and International Law? Marilee Corr provided research
assistance in the preparation of this manuscript.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
2. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
3. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
4. Bradford Berenson, The Uncertain Legacy of Rasul v. Bush, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
39 (2004)(remarks in this issue).
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Before I turn to my prepared remarks, I want to begin by taking the
opposite position. I believe that we should be very concerned about our security
if we do not place any check on executive power. When we deny detainees
rights under the Geneva Convention, 5 for example, or when we are not perceived
to be obeying international law, we put our own troops at risk if they are
captured overseas. In addition, when we do not protect the minimum rights of
detainees, we have greater difficulty in gathering intelligence from our allies.
There are a number of countries who have refused to give us intelligence
precisely because they are concerned that the information might be used as part
of proceedings that lack basic rights protections. More broadly, if we are not
perceived as adhering to the rule of law, we risk losing the support of our allies
in the fight against terrorism. 6 Yet we cannot win this fight alone. We need the
cooperation of other countries around the world.
In large part because of our detention policies, the standing of the United
States has fallen dramatically in the world. For example, in Indonesia, where I
did some work for the State Department, support for the United States was at
75% before the war on terror. Now, in part because of concerns about
infringements on rights, support for the U.S. in Indonesia has slipped
dramatically. This is significant because Indonesia is the most populous
Muslim country in the world, and formerly its population strongly supported the
United States. I submit that this shift should be a source of great concern. Of
course, there are people who will hate us no matter what we do. But if we lose
the respect of moderates around the world, it will severely hinder our ability to
prosecute the war on terror.
Now, turning to my main topic this morning, I want to focus on a further
unresolved question from the Supreme Court cases that has not been sufficiently
discussed: What happens when terrorists are detained not by U.S. authorities, but
by private contractors hired by U.S. authorities? This question is not merely
speculative; it reflects a practice that is on the rise.
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
6. See generally Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions,
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the-Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407,
1450 (2002) (discussing the reluctance of some nations to cooperate with the United States due to
their perceptions of the illegitimacy of the use of military tribunals).
7. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, WHAT THE WORLD THINKS IN
2002 4, (Dec. 4, 2002), available at http:l/people-press.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf (reporting that in
1999/2000 75% of Indonesians held a favorable view of the U.S.) (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
8. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, VIEWS OF A CHANGING WORLD
3, (June 3, 2003), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf ("Since last summer,
favorable ratings for the U.S. have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia.") (last visited Dec. 18,
2004).
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In the domestic context, we have a very large amount of literature on the
subject of privatization; increasingly, prisons, schools, healthcare, and welfare
programs are being run by private companies. One of the concerns raised by this
privatization is the degree to which privatization results in reduced
accountability. 9 Legal realist arguments notwithstanding, constitutional scrutiny
typically applies only against state actors. Thus, privatization often threatens to
remove historically public functions from constitutional oversight.
In the international sphere, we are likewise seeing an increasing turn to
private contractors performing what we might think of as core governmental
functions. For example, even within the military, private actors are performing
more and more military functions. 10 In the Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, where
detainees were tortured and abused, the individuals involved in the torture
included not only members of the military, but private contractors hired from the
private sector to do the interrogation and translation. 11 If we see the principles
of Rasul applied so that there is U.S. judicial review of governmental detention
facilities anywhere in the world, I think it is not far-fetched to think that we
might see an increasing turn to privately run detention facilities using private
contractors for supervision and interrogation in order to avoid U.S. constitutional
oversight.
Accordingly, I think it is vital to consider to what extent private actors
involved in the treatment of detainees in the war on terror can be held
accountable for their actions. One thing I think we learn is that accountability is
actually very difficult to achieve under international law with respect to either
state or private actors. Thus, although in the domestic context many scholars
argue that privatization leads to a dramatically reduced scope of accountability,
we may not be able to translate that conclusion to the international sphere
because the baseline is different. Accountability for state actors is not nearly as
robust in the international realm as in the domestic realm; therefore, you do not
lose quite as much when you turn to private actors. Moreover, although there are
not many avenues to hold private actors accountable, there are some
possibilities, which I will discuss. In particular, I would like to suggest that
human rights lawyers and scholars should consider not only accountability
through the vehicle of suits to enforce international law norms, but also suits to
enforce ordinary municipal law.
9. Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507,
1508 (2001).
10. See P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12. 2004, at
B03 ("More than 20,000 private contractors are working for the U.S. government in Iraq,
performing a wide range of military functions.").
11. Id. ("Sixteen of the 44 incidents of abuse the Army's latest reports say happened at Abu
Ghraib involved private contractors outside the domain of both the U.S. military and the U.S.
government.").
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As I just mentioned, in the domestic context when we see privatization
taking place, we see a reduction in accountability. This is because domestically,
many of our most cherished rights are conceived of as rights against the state.
Accordingly, when functions that were previously performed by state actors are
turned over to private actors, it is unclear whether those rights against the state
run against private actors as well. Thus, in a privately run prison or welfare
program where officials have a great deal of discretion in running the program, it
is not at all clear that those officials will be subject to constitutional or federal
civil rights scrutiny. You have to show a nexus to state action, 12 and the trend
has been to make it more difficult to establish such a nexus. There are some
• 13
exceptions, but generally you have to show very specific links to state actors,
so the more discretion that private actors have in running the program, the more
difficult it is to establish state action.
In the international context, the baseline is different. Here, although many
norms protect the rights of individuals against state actors (and there are
increasing avenues for enforcing these norms), the enforcement mechanisms are
not nearly as robust as in the U.S. domestic context. To illustrate this point, I
will take the torture and abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib, as an example. I
will briefly look at the avenues of accountability for the state actors and then
look at what the avenues of accountability might be for private actors.
For state actors, you might think that you could bring either a criminal or
civil case in Iraqi courts. However, the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) granted immunity to U.S. and other foreign actors in Iraq. 14 There is an
open question, of course, as to whether such an immunity provision can truly
shield individuals from accusations of gross human rights violations. But in any
event, the Iraqi legal system is not in any condition to consider those kinds of
cases. In addition, there is no international tribunal with jurisdiction, so the best
options are really domestic. Indeed, we have actually seen some accountability
within the U.S. military justice system. Charges have been brought against eight
12. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining the presumption that one
must be acting under the color of law in order to violate the law of nations); see also Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
13. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 ("[W]e hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals.").
14. See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, ORDER 17, STATUS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY, MNF, CERTAIN MISSIONS AND PERSONNEL IN IRAQ, § 2, para. 1, available at
http://www.cpa-
Iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_ 17_Status ofCoalitionRevwithAnnexA.pdf
("Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel,
property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal
process.").
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of the military personnel involved in the abuse, and four have been convicted.
However, these are fairly low-level actors. Although the military has conducted
some informal investigations, we haven't seen very much in the form of
accountability at higher levels, even though some of the reporting suggests that
responsibility may go much further up the chain of command. Congress has
held some hearings, but probably not as many as it should have. In addition, we
have seen very few informal sanctions, such as the firing or demotion of those
implicated in the abuses. Finally, thus far no criminal or civil cases have been
brought in U.S. civilian courts, though such options may be available.
I now turn to the avenues available to hold private actors accountable. At
Abu Ghraib, there were private companies whose employees were involved in
the abuse. These are companies whose employees served as interrogators and• • •15
translators and who, according to reports, directly committed abuses. As in the
case of the state actors, the Iraqi courts provide few if any options, due to the
CPA grant of immunity. Again, even if there is an exception to the immunity for
serious human rights violations, the courts there are not in any shape to consider
such cases. Also as with the state actors, there is no international criminal
tribunal with jurisdiction. Thus, although there is some precedent for criminally
prosecuting private actors in international courts for violations of international
law, in this situation there is no international forum available.
With regard to domestic options, the U.S. military courts are not available
for cases against private actors. In a series of decisions from the late 1950s and
early 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court has prohibited military trials of civilians
absent a declaration of war. 16 The only plausible existing options are in the U.S.
civilian courts. In that regard, there are several statutes that essentially
incorporate international criminal categories into domestic law. For example,
there is a statute that makes torture committed outside the United States a
crime, 17 and there is also a statute that makes war crimes - wherever they are
committed - a crime.1 8 It is therefore conceivable that private actors could be
15. See Singer, supra note 10.
16. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. t (1957) (holding that civilian dependents accompanying the
armed forces overseas in time of peace are not triable by court-martial for capital offenses); see
also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (prohibiting military jurisdiction over civilian
dependents in time of peace, regardless of whether the offense was capital or noncapital); Grisham
v Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding civilian employees committing capital offenses not
amenable to military jurisdiction); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (expanding
Grisham to include non-capital offenses).
17. The Torture Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2340, 2340A, & 2340B. Note, however, that 18
U.S.C. § 2340(3) was amended by the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005, sec. 1089, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat 1811, 2067 to redefine the "United
States" as "the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States."
18. The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
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prosecuted under these statutes. However, because such prosecutions would
require the Bush Administration to initiate proceedings, they are unlikely to take
place. This is particularly true given the Administration's reluctance both to
characterize what happened at Abu Ghraib as torture and to acknowledge that the
detainees even have rights under the Geneva Conventions such that what took
place at Abu Ghraib could be classified as war crimes. In these cases, there is
also the added hurdle of state action because, for example, the right to be free
from torture is conceived of as a right only against official misconduct and is
therefore analogous to some of our domestic constitutional rights. Likewise,
state action may also be a hurdle in making out a case for war crimes.
However, there are options for bringing criminal cases under domestic
criminal law categories. For example, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act allows for criminal char es to be brought against U.S. contractors working
for the Defense Department. 9 Congress enacted this statute precisely because
U.S. military courts are not an option for private actors. 2 Nevertheless, one of
the limitations to this avenue is that it only applies to contractors of the Defense
21Department. Many of the contractors in Iraq, however, are operating under
contracts with the CIA or with the Department of Interior, 22 so the statute would
not apply.
To get around this difficulty, it is worth noting that the U.S.A. Patriot Act23
actually extends something called the Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction (SMTJ) of federal courts to include facilities run by the United
States overseas.24 Thus, a prosecutor might bring charges against private actors
mistreating detainees overseas if the abuse constitutes a crime and is therefore
prohibited in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. In fact, one case
has been brought against a private contractor who had been working for the CIA
and was implicated in detainee abuse not in Iraq, but in Afghanistan. 25 He has
been indicted in the United States for assault committed within the U.S. SMTJ.
26
19. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000).
20. See Glenn R. Schmitt, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: The Continuing
Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad -
Problem Solved?, ARMY LAW. (Dec. 2000).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3267.
22. Richard A. Serrano, The Conflict in Iraq: Pentagon Cites Widespread Involvement in Prison
Abuses, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at Al.
23. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272-
402 (codified in various amended sections of the U.S. Code).
24. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(9) (2000).
25. See Farah Stockman, CIA Contractor is Charged in Beating of Afghan Detainee, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 18, 2004, at Al.
26. See id.
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On the civil side, we have the possibility of suits under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). 27 We will be hearing more about the ATCA later on this
morning, but, as Dean Koh mentioned last night, the statute provides what is
.... 28
essentially a Bivens claim in U.S. courts for international law violations. There
are a number of issues that remain to be litigated about the scope of this statute
in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa last term. 29 Lawyers
have already brought suit against the contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib
abuse under the ATCA. As with potential criminal prosecutions for torture or
war crimes, the corresponding claims under the ATCA pose significant state
action problems because many of the international law violations that give rise to
claims under the ATCA are conceived of as rights against the state.3 1 Perhaps
not surprisingly, U.S. courts, in interpreting these international law claims under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, have looked to the domestic law of state action to
determine how much of a nexus there must be between the state and the private
actor implicated in the alleged abuse.32 However, what is a bit surprising in
ATCA cases is that courts have applied the state action doctrine in a much
broader way than in domestic cases, requiring a far less specific connection
between the private actor and the state than is usually required in the domestic
context. 33 There is definitely a real possibility that a plaintiff could establish a
sufficient nexus to the state to proceed against a private contractor under the
ATCA.
Finally, I think it is important to consider the possibility of ordinary
municipal law claims, such as tort claims that might be brought either
domestically or transnationally (that is, suits that might be brought in the United
States for actions taken outside the United States). In the human rights field,
there is a growing amount of literature on corporate responsibility. 34 Scholars
and practitioners have begun to grapple with the problem that corporations have
increasing power around the world and are in some cases committing human
27.28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
28. Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, the 2004 Term: The Supreme
Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA COMP. & INT'L L. J. 1 (2004) (remarks in this issue); see
also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
29. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
30. See T, Christian Miller, Ex-Detainees Sue 2 U.S. Contractors, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at
A9.
31. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1140 (2002).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1145.
34. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); see also Beth Stevens, Translating Filartiga: A
Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human
Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
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rights violations. Because many (though not all) of those that are committing
human rights violations are non-state actors, many scholars have sought to
expand the categories of international human rights so as to encompass these
non-governmental entities. This is certainly one approach, but I think that an
under-explored avenue is the extent to which ordinary municipal law, such as the
law of tort, might provide norms that could be used to address the same
underlying conduct. For example, assault or battery in the law of many countries
would cover the same conduct that would give rise to a torture claim. As
transnational tort cases can sometimes be brought in areas such as products
liability, so too human rights suits might also take the form of a transnational
tort. In any event, I suggest it as a possible area worthy of further research and
work.
I would like to conclude with three points. First, privatization in the
international realm is a serious issue that is under-explored and that raises unique
challenges for international law. Increasingly, functions that we think of as core
governmental functions, such as military functions, are being performed by
private actors. Second, when privatization takes place, the impact on
accountability may not be as dramatic as in the domestic law setting because of
the fact that there is a different baseline. Finally, I think we need to pay attention
to the possibility that ordinary municipal law claims might be brought
transnationally to impose some measure of accountability in these
circumstances. Thank you very much.
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